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1CIRCUIT BREAKER ANOMALY
STATEMENT
Battery C was not connected to main bus B just prior to entry.
DISCUSSION
During Apollo 14 entry, at 800 feet altitude, the switches for dis-
connecting battery busses from the main busses were placed to "off". Al-
though both main busses should have been de-energized by this action,
main A remained energized until it was manually disabled by opening the
associated circuit breakers after landing.
A preliminary evaluation indicated that motor switch S1 had failed
to transfer to "off" (fig. 1). Postflight testing verified this condi-
tion; however, had this been the only failure, both main busses would
have remained energized until the circuit breakers were opened. Addi-
tional spacecraft testing disclosed an intermittent condition within the
battery C-to-main bus B circuit (fig. 1). The circuit breaker which con-
nects battery C to main bus B could be closed mechanically by applying
nine pounds of pressure to the actuator knob, but an additional three
pounds was required to maintain circuit continuity. The condition was
repeatable on the bench, and X-rays showed one set of contacts were being
held apart by an unidentified substance. Disassembly and microscopic ex-
amination of the breaker showed the contacts to be cratered (fig. 2) and
partially covered with a sufficient quantity of white crystalline sub-
stance to separate the contacts. Chemical analysis of particles removed
from the circuit breaker showed both molydisulfide (dry lube) and glass
were present.
One component inside the breaker was made of fiberglass which pro-
vides a source of glass particles. Glass particles could have become
separated from the component, and could have been responsible for the
failure.
The possibility that molytrioxide, [a by-product resulting from ex-
posing molydisulfide (dry-lube) to heat] was also explored to determine
if it could have caused the problem. The tests results were negative as
molytrioxide could not be produced within the circuit breaker environment.
The process specifications and assembly techniques were reviewed and
found to be satisfactory. In addition, the cleanliness requirements of
the assembly facility were satisfactory.
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Figure 2 . - Circuit breaker contact with cratering. 
4The performance history of this type of circuit breaker in the Apollo
program shows that approximately 3400 circuit breakers have been used
without any previous failures of this type. In addition, there are no
criticality-1 single-point failure applications involving these types of
breakers.
CONCLUSIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTION
Continuity through the circuit breaker in the mechanically closed
condition was prevented by a foreign substance, most probably glass par-
ticles, on the contact surface. Since this was the only failure of this
type in over 3400 units that have been flown and since no circuit breaker
is a single-point failure for crew safety or mission success, no corrective
action is deemed necessary.
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